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CASES NOTED
of the decision rather than a justification. It can only be hoped that the
probable consequences of this decision will prompt the legislature to
recommend to Florida voters a constitutional amendment which will
eliminate the inequities of the present homestead provisions. 50
WALTER WAYNE SYLVESTER
A DIVORCED MOTHER'S RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER THE
WRONGFUL DEATH OF MINORS ACT
The parents of a minor child were remarried to each other sub-
sequent to a divorce decree which awarded custody to the mother. A
second divorce decree made no provision for the child's custody. In an
action by the divorced mother for the minor's wrongful death, the trial
court rendered a judgment in her favor. On appeal, held, reversed: re-
marriage of the parents voids the custody provisions of a prior divorce
decree, and when a second divorce decree contains no custody provision,
a mother cannot recover for the-minor child's wrongful death under the
Wrongful Death of Minors Act.' Eppes v. Covey, 141 So.2d 747 (Fla.
App. 1962).
50. There arises the question of how much freedom the legislature has in enacting a
value limitation on homestead property. FLA. Co NsT. art. X, § 6 states: "The legislature
shall enact such laws as may be necessary to enforce the provisions of this Article." The
legislature would appear to be restricted from enacting such a law correcting an inequity
which has its basis in the constitution.
Constitutional amendment is the answer to the problem and according to some writers
an even more drastic approach is needed. "[I]t is doubtful that a state constitution should
contain any provisions with reference to the homestead exemption. Experience in other
states indicates that the legislative body may be trusted to give adequate protection to
homestead rights. If statutes prove to be inequitable, unwise or inadequate, they can be
changed . . . . [Iun any revision of the constitution the question of eliminating any refer-
ence to the homestead exemption is one serious consideration. Should any mention be
considered necessary, it should be limited to a declaration of general policy, leaving to the
legislature the task of effective implementation." Woodward, supra note 49, at 1047, 1053.
1. FLA. STAT. § 768.03 (1961), reads: "Whenever the death of any minor child shall be
caused by the wrongful act, negligence, carelessness or default of any individual, or by
the wrongful act, negligence, carelessness or default of any private association or persons,
or by the wrongful act, negligence, carelessness or default of any officer, agent or employee of
any private association of persons, acting in his capacity as such officer, agent or
employee, or by the wrongful act, negligence, carelessness or default of any corporation, or
by the wrongful act, negligence, carelessness or default of any officer or agent, or employee
of any corporation acting in his capacity as such officer, agent or employee, the father
of such minor child, or if the father be not living, the mother may maintain an action
against such individual, private association of persons, or corporation, and may recover, not
only for the loss of services of such minor child, but in addition thereto, such sum for the
mental pain and suffering of the parent (or both parents) if they survive, as the jury may
assess." In Ward v. Baskin, 94 So.2d 859, 860 (Fla. 1957), the Florida Supreme Court
recognized that this statute is "peculiar to Florida with no exact counterpart in any other
state." It added: "The peculiarity consists in the provision that when suing for the wrongful
death of a minor child, the father is authorized to recover damages not only for the loss of
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The Florida Wrongful Death of Minors Act was passed in 18992 to
allow parents to recover directly for the wrongful death of a minor child.'
It is a statute in derogation of the common law and, as such, must be
strictly construed.4 Consequently, actions arising under the act are main-
tainable only by the persons authorized therein.5 The right of action
provision declares that "the father of such minor child, or if the father be
not living, the mother may maintain an action . . . ." Early decisions
construed this provision to grant to the father a precedent right of
recovery.' A fortiori, a mother could not recover directly for a minor
child's wrongful death in the father's lifetime.7 Later interpretations,
consistent with the remedial objectives of the act,8 have favored a more
liberal construction of the mother's right to sue while the father is still
living. In Hadley v. Tallahassee,9 a right of action for the wrongful death
of an illegitimate minor child was held to accrue exclusively to its mother,
since a bastard has no father recognized by law. In the case of Haddock v.
Florida Motor Lines Corp.,"° a divorced mother who had been awarded
custody of a minor child was allowed to recover for its wrongful death
under the act. Such recovery was held consonant with the legislative intent
in light of section 4 of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitu-
tion," which grants to every person a remedy for injury done him. The
court noted that the award of custody to a divorced mother has the effect
of granting to her the legal right to the minor child's services. 2 There-
fore, it established the rule (hereinafter referred to as the Haddock rule)
that an award of custody to the mother transfers to her the father's right
to sue for loss of services under the act, in addition to her right to be
compensated for her mental pain and suffering. 3
services but also for the mental pain and suffering of himself and his wife." Therefore, the
court concluded that "the many decisions of other courts dealing with the subject are ...of
little persuasion in Florida."
2. Fla. Laws 1899, ch. 4722.
3. Brailsford v. Campbell, 89 So.2d 241 (Fla. 1956); Nolan v. Moore, 81 Fla. 594,
600, '88 So. 601 (1921) ; Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Moseley, 60 Fla. 186, 53 So. 718 (1910).
4. Haddock v. Florida Motor Lines Corp., 150 Fla. 848, 9 So.2d 98 (1942); Nolan v.
Moore, 81 Fla. 594, 88 So. 601 (1921); Hadley v. Tallahassee, 67 Fla. 436, 65 So. 545
(1914).
5. Florida East Coast Ry. v. Jackson, 65 Fla. 393, 62 So. 210 (1913); Louisville
& N.R.R. v. Jones, 45 Fla. 407, 34 So. 246 (1903); Duval v. Hunt, 34 Fla. 85, 15 So.
876 (1894).
6. Mock v. Evans Light & Ice Co., 88 Fla. 113, 101 So. 203 (1924); Florida East
Coast Ry. v. Jackson, 65 Fla. 393, 62 So. 210 (1913).
7. Mock v. Evans Light & Ice Co., 88 Fla. 113, 101 So. 203 (1924).
8. Latimer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 285 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1960); Klepper v.
Breslin, 83 So.2d 587 (Fla. 1955) ; Nolan v. Moore, 81 Fla. 594, 88 So. 601 (1921) ; BuRDicX,
TORTS § 246 (4th ed. 1926).
9. 67 Fla. 436, 65 So. 545 (1914).
10. 150 Fla. 848, 9 So.2d 98 (1942). The Supreme Court here receded from its
opinion in Mock v. Evans Light & Ice Co., 88 Fla. 113, 101 So. 203 (1924), insofar as
Mock did not allow the mother to maintain a wrongful death action in the father's lifetime.
11. FLA. CONST. DECL. or RIGHTS § 4 provides: "All courts in this state shall be open, so
that every person for any injury done him ... shall have remedy, by due course of law ..




The effect of a parental remarriage upon the custody provisions of a
prior divorce decree presents a question of first impression in Florida. It
is uniformly held that when the custody of a minor child is awarded
to either parent, their remarriage to each other nullifies the earlier divorce
decree and restores to the parents their joint right of custody. 4 This
remerger of the parents' several rights of custody into one common right
terminates the divorce court's jurisdiction over the parties and their
minor child.' A fortiori, in a subsequent divorce action custody of the
minor can be awarded differently. 6
Pursuant to the Haddock rule, a wife-mother is legally entitled to the
minor child's services and may sue to recover therefor only when she has
been awarded custody in a divorce decree from the father. Does it
follow that when a divorce decree dissolving the parents' remar-
riage contains no custody provision, a wife-mother has no right, in law,
to the child's services? Would her recovery therefor be barred upon
the minor's wrongful death? The Eppes case answered both questions
affirmatively.
In the Eppes case, the court first insisted upon a strict construction
of the Wrongful Death of Minors Act because it is a statute in derogation
of the common law.'7 It recognized that under the act, a divorced mother
may sue for the wrongful death of a minor child when she has been
awarded custody in a divorce decree from the father.'" It noted, however,
that the parents' remarriage voided the custody provisions of the prior
divorce decree.' 9 And, since the second divorce decree made no provision
for the minor's custody, it held that the divorced mother could not recover
for his wrongful death under the act.2° In denying the plaintiff's right of
action, the court specifically refused to expand the Haddock rule.2
Directing attention to the unjust holding, it concluded that: "We are
powerless to amend that statute in order to provide for ...a right of
action, such amendment being a matter exclusively for the consideration
and action of the legislative branch .... ,22
14. Lockard v. Lockard, 102 N.E.2d 747 (Ohio C.P. 1951); McAlhany v. Allen, 195
Ga. 150, 23 S.E.2d 676 (1942); NELSON, DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 15.40 (2d ed. 1961).
15. Ex parte Phillips, 266 Ala. 198, 95 So.2d 77 (1957); Oliphant v. Oliphant, 177
Ark. 613, 7 S.W.2d 783 (1928); Dunlap v. Dunlap, 88 Old. 200, 212 Pac. 608 (1923);
Corbett v. Corbett, 123 Ohio St. 76, 174 N.E. 10 (1930).
16. Jenkins v. Followell, 262 P.2d 880 (Okl. 1953); Oliphant v. Oliphant, supra note
15; 27B C.J.S. Divorce § 314 (1939).
17. Eppes v. Covey, 141 So.2d 747, 748 (Fla. App. 1962). "Since . . . a statute in
derogation of the common law must be strictly construed, in the instant case we must strictly
construe section 768.03. .. ."
18. Id. at 748. This is merely a reiteration of the Haddock rule.
19. See cases cited in Eppes v. Covey, 141 So.2d 747, 748, 749 (Fla. App. 1962), and
Corbett v. Corbett, 123 Ohio St. 76, 174 N.E. 10 (1930).
20. Eppes v. Covey, 141 So.2d 747 (Fla. App. 1962).
21. Id. at 749. "If we were to uphold the plaintiff's right of action in the unique situa-
tion before us on this appeal, we would have to carry a step further the rule recognized in
the Haddock case in the construction of a statute. This we are not prepared to do."
22. Ibid.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
It is submitted that the court was correct in denying recovery for
the wrongful death of a minor child to a divorced mother who did not
have custody thereof. In the opinion of the writer, an extension of the
Haddock rule in the instant case would have constituted a judicial amend-
ment of the act. That the result of the Eppes case was harshly inequitable
is the fault, not of the judiciary, but of legislative recalcitrance to correct
the act's grossly inadequate right of action provision. At present, several
problem areas remain which can create needless hardships, absent liberal
judicial construction. Namely, if the act were strictly construed, a mother
could not maintain a wrongful death action if the father: (a) abandoned
the child and there was no divorce; or (b) was declared mentally in-
competent; or (c) was confined for insanity.
23
It is suggested that a legislative solution.in the form of a redrafting
of the "right of action" provision of the Wrongful Death of Minors Act is
long overdue. The revision should expand the mother's right to sue under
the act by allowing her to maintain an action thereunder in case of the
father's death or desertion of his family, or if the mother has been
awarded custody of a minor child in a divorce decree from the father, 24
or if the father has been declared mentally incompetent, or if the mother
was supporting the child at the time of its death.25 The amendment should
also provide that recovery by either spouse shall be a bar to an action
by the other, and that the right of action under the act shall include
actions ex contractu and ex delicto.
26
ALBERT L. CARRICARTE
THE PROPRIETY OF HOLDING A GRAND JURY IN
CONTEMPT OF COURT
A duly empaneled grand jury at the close of its deliberations filed an
interim report with the court. While the grand jury was in recess, subject
to recall upon order of the assigned judge, a summons was issued to each
23. Although these fact situations have not yet been adjudicated in Florida, it is
submitted that in the absence of an extension of the Haddock rule, recovery would be
denied to the mother if the father were living. Only by deciding, as in Haddock, that under
section 4 of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution the mother should have
a right of action under the act, and, therefore, it was the intention of the legislature that
she have one, would her action be allowed? As evidenced by the instant case, such an
extension of the Haddock rule is unlikely.
24. This is merely a codification of the Haddock rule. See notes 10-13 supra and accom-
panying text.
25. This provision would allow recovery by a divorced mother in a fact situation similar
to that presented by the instant case.
26. This provision allowing actions ex contractu and ex delicto is already a part of the
Wrongful Death Act, FLA. STAT. § 768.01 (1961). Its incorporation into the Wrongful Death
of Minors Act would prevent inequitable decisions such as Latimer v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 285 F.2d 152 (5th Cir. 1960). Therein the court held that a wrongful death action by
the father of a minor child is not maintainable under the act where such action arose upon
a breach of implied warranty, since § 768.03 does not encompass actions ex contractu.
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